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REFLECTIONS

ON THE

LAW OF 1813,

FOR

LAYING AN EMBARGO

ON ALL

SHIPS AND VESSELS

IN

THE PORTS AND HARBORS

OF THE

UNITED STATES.

BY SAMUEL MCKEE, WILLIAM P. DUVALL, AND
" THOMAS MONTGOMERY.

1814.

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REFLECTIONS, &c.

9 F 1904 W.O.W.

WE offer the following reflections to the candid, honest, and dispassionate citizens of the congressional districts which we have the honor to represent, with a view to our justification for having voted against the passage of the embargo bill; and we cherish a lively hope that a very large majority of the citizens of our respective districts will be disposed to give our remarks an attentive perusal, and our arguments that consideration which they intrinsically merit: and we trust too, that upon taking such a course, our fellow-citizens will be convinced, that we voted correctly, or that the measure is one so problematical in its nature, that men equally wise and honest might differ on it in their votes. To those who believe in the infallibility of a favorite President, to those who believe that a dominant party under *whatever name*, will never err, and to those who believe that every remark which they read in a *favorite newspaper* is just the very language of wisdom, we need not address ourselves with any hope of convincing them that we voted correctly. To those of the first class, we just remark, that they ought to desire to see the attendance of congress dispensed with, because the wages of the members is too much to be paid for the mere formula of registering the views of the President; to those of the second class, we remark, that they ought to be in haste to take such measures as would *perpetuate the power* of their favorites; and to those of the third class, we remark, that they ought to labor to bring all the powers of the government directly under the controul of their *favorite editor*.

Before we proceed to offer our arguments to prove the impolicy of the late embargo law, we deem it somewhat important to submit a short sketch of the history of its introduction into congress, together with its progress into a law. During the summer session of 1813, the President transmitted to both houses of congress a message, in which he expressed it as his opinion, that the object of our enemy, the British, in blockading our ports and harbors, was to favor an unlawful trade between our citizens and the enemy, by which they could procure supplies of provisions, &c., for the use of their fleets and armies; and to prevent any commerce on our part, except such as suited their exigencies, and must go to their markets. This we state from memory, and believe it to be substantially correct. No document whatever, substantiating any fact in relation to the subject matter, accompanied this communication; and it was stated to the house of Representatives, by the chairman of the committee of foreign relations, that the President was applied to to know whether he had in his possession any evidence which would bear upon the subject; to which he answered, that he had none, but that which was known to the members generally. Upon this message, after some preliminary proceedings, a bill was framed and reported to the house: on the day it was reported, it was moved to postpone its consideration *for one day*, urging that its great length precluded the possibility of correctly understanding all its principles; but the motion was overruled; and the bill, containing about twenty sections, passed through all the formula of legislation in the lower house in the space of six or seven hours. On a question which went to try the passage of the bill, we voted in the negative; and we say respectively that we did it conscientiously, after the best consideration which we could give the arguments on each side. We say arguments, for as to the evidence of facts, we had none, unless a few detached newspaper statements were to be considered as such,

This bill was rejected in the Senate by a majority of one or two votes.

At an early day in the winter session of 1813, the President, by a confidential communication to both houses, recommended an embargo, and the subject was taken up in great haste in the house of Representatives and passed. The communication of the President was unaccompanied by any evidence of facts, evincing the existence of the evil intended to be guarded against by the law; and a motion, made with a view to draw from him any evidence in his power, which would serve to show the extent of the evil intended to be prevented by the passage of the law, was overruled, and the bill very hastily passed. We say respectively, that we gave the subject matter the best consideration which the knowledge we possessed enabled us, and would cheerfully have heard any arguments in its favor; but those in its favor did not deign to offer any; and we conscientiously voted against its passage.

We deem it proper to state, before we proceed to examine the policy of the embargo, that we have repeatedly expressed our opinion that the present war with Great Britain is founded on *just cause*, that we have voted the collection of taxes, and for other measures with a view to its *vigorous prosecution*; and do respectively aver, that we will heartily concur in any measure which will have, in our opinions, but the appearance of actively and efficiently operating upon our enemy, so that the balance of injury resulting may be in our favor: but against measures that will produce most injury to ourselves, we do protest, as not calculated to bring the war to a happy conclusion.

We will now proceed to consider the policy of the present embargo law: in the prosecution of which, we will first consider *its effects upon the enemy*: secondly, we will consider *its effects upon ourselves*. The result of this enquiry, if we are not greatly mistaken, will show that in all reasonable probability, the balance,

of injuries resulting from the measure will be greatly *against us*.

We do not deny that the British have drawn some supplies from our country by trading with some of our own citizens, in a manner highly to be deprecated; to what extent we know not, but do not believe it has been to the extent which some pretend to believe. But while we admit this fact, we do not hesitate to express it as our opinion, that the passage of the embargo will only affect this evil in a partial degree. The candid must admit, that those who have not been heretofore restrained from the practice by the love of country, nor the pains and penalties consequent upon a conviction of treason, will notwithstanding the passage of this law, pursue their old course if practicable and profitable; and we really believe, from our vast length of sea coast, our numerous small inlets, combined with the aid which may be derived from the blockading squadrons of the enemy, that such practices will prevail in some degree, in despite of all the exertions of the government under the provisions of the embargo; and that they will draw to themselves some of our most suitable commodities.

We admit that the purchase of some of our commodities through the medium of neutrals, may, in some small degree, profit the enemy...the amount of this advantage we believe to consist of the difference between a high and higher price. But, after making this admission, we feel authorised to say, that the idea of starving the fleets and armies of Great Britain by the passage of this law, is a perfect chimera; neither can we believe, from what we know of our enemy, and the condition of the world, that its pressure in any way can be such as to dispose her to do us justice.

Great Britain has her thousand ships of war; she has a great number of merchant vessels; she can have the aid of all neutrals; and she can raise from eighty to one hundred millions pounds sterling per annum: these are her means for *purchase and transportation*; and the

ports of the *world*, (1) with the exception of France and its dependencies, Denmark and America, are open to her. We excepted France (2) improperly, because we know from past experience, if a good price in English guineas, or articles suitable to the maintenance of his armies can be obtained, Buonaparte will permit every particle of surplus produce in France to go to the enemy. Is there, then, any person pretending to a knowledge of the various regions of this globe, and the condition of the inhabitants thereof, who can say, in candor, that Great Britain will not have it in her power to victual her fleets and armies without our products; and that she may not have the requisite supply of military stores and articles used in their manufactories? If there is any such, we expect not to convince them of the propriety of our vote.

We pretend not to the most exact knowledge of the products of the various regions of the earth, and the condition of its inhabitants; but we believe we know that Russia, containing a population of about forty millions, are nearly all agriculturists, and that vast quantities of grain, naval and military stores, can be drawn from it by the way of her large navigable rivers, the Baltic and Black seas; that Sweden can furnish large supplies of naval and military stores; that large quantities of provisions can be drawn from the interior of Germany, through Prussia; that large quantities of bread-stuff, cotton, and provisions, can be drawn from the Turkish possessions bordering on the Black sea, the Levant and Mediterranean; that large quantities of cotton, and some bread-stuffs, can be obtained from Egypt; that bread-stuffs can be obtained from the coast of the Mediterranean called the Barbary coast; that large quantities of provisions, &c. can be obtained from Brazil; and that cotton can be obtained from sundry of the islands in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico. We hesitate not to say, from any researches we have been able to make, that our enemy can be *abundantly* supplied without our products. We know that many of

(1) See note at the end. (2) See note at the end.

the countries which we have named equal ours in fertility, if the common authorities are to be relied on; and that nothing but our superior industry and enterprize has enabled us to supplant them. But upon this subject let experience speak. In December 1807 a general embargo law was passed, in the hope that Great Britain and France, or one of them, from the loss of the products of our country, would feel such a pressure as would convince one or both of them of the policy of doing us justice. This law was passed under circumstances far more *auspicious* than the present, and it remained in force about fourteen months: during its existence, Spain and Portugal were almost entirely in possession of Buonaparte, in the name of Joseph Buonaparte. *This is not now the case.* In the month of June, after its passage, Buonaparte overthrew the emperor of Russia at the battle of Friedland, and immediately drew him into the continental system of prohibiting commerce with Great Britain, and consequently her enemy. *It is not so now.. Russia is the ally of England.* During its existence Prussia was under the direction of Buonaparte, and now she is the ally of England: during its existence Austria declared she would have no commercial intercourse with Britain, *and now she is the ally of Britain:* during its continuance England was in a state of war with Turkey, *and Turkey is now neutral.* This state of things between England and the various nations mentioned, combined with our embargo, so much more strongly calculated to bring her to a sense of justice, and to forego her favorite system of the monopoly of all commerce, failed to produce the end desired. She was no doubt hard pressed; but *her people, her fleets, and armies, were not starved;* her factories, although injured, were still carried on; and she refused to do us that justice which we demanded. Her pride, too, at that time, was not so strongly assailed as at the present crisis: we alike complained of French and British aggressions, and professed to operate on them both. If

our view is correct, the plain inference is, that the passage of the embargo will have no other effect than to subject our enemy to some additional inconvenience in the prosecution of the war, and to compel them to pay somewhat higher for bread-stuffs, and such other articles as they have heretofore drawn from this country; and, indeed, it may be all resolved into the *disadvantage of paying a higher price*. This we confidently believe will never produce such a pressure as to induce them to yield the points in controversy.

We now propose to examine the effects of the embargo on the people of these states. By the passage of this embargo law, all hope of *increasing the specie of this country is cut off*; and the forty or fifty (3) millions of dollars worth per annum, of articles for foreign markets, the produce of our soil and industry, is laid snugly by to waste by the operation of time and accident. This, to our view, is a *great evil*....we cannot but believe there will be occasional drains of specie, and without a correspondent increase, it must become scarce, and the energies of the nation palsied for its want. Money, to a nation, situated as ours, is like vital air to the body natural; as the body natural must cease to act when a sufficient portion of vital air is wanting; so, when the specie of our country is drained, the energies of the nation will be paralyzed.

But it will be perhaps said, that the enemy, by the means of their blockading squadrons, will prevent the exportation of our products. This, we believe, they can only *partially effect* with all their exertions: the vast length of our sea coast from the extreme of Maine to the Gulf of Mexico, our many inlets, and the aid of neutrals, combined with the activity and enterprize of our merchants, will enable us to export much. We have been informed, and believe, that several shipments have been made from Norfolk, with good faith, through the darkness of the nights; that during the autumn and winter, blockading squadrons cannot lie off the port of New Orleans, without imminent risque of destruction;

(3) See note at the end.

and consequently, that vessels may, from that port, seize favorable opportunities and get to sea.

By the passage of this law, the agriculturists and distillers of our country, at the same time that they are called upon by the government to *contribute* towards its support, are denied the *means* of raising the money; for the merchants cannot be expected to purchase from them, when they cannot hope to be able to export fairly.

By the passage of this law, merchants who have bought on credit, will be *subjected to ruin* in many instances; and their creditors participate in their losses. Instead of active enterprising traders, watching and siezing the favorable opportunity of fairly enriching themselves and the farmers, and adding to the national stock, we will have a band of *idlers*, reviling our government. This law will certainly not bear as oppressively on the people of the western country as on many in the eastern: such was the fact with respect to the embargo of 1807; and yet we believe we could name many in the west who were ruined by the operation of that law. We can now make no estimate of the injury sustained by our enemy; and we know that we sustained great losses without seeing the end produced, which was expected.

By the passage of this law, nearly the whole of the revenue to be derived from the *importation of foreign merchandize is cut off*; for neutrals cannot be expected to resort much to our ports, when they are deprived of the advantage of the profits upon a return cargo; and our own merchants are prohibited from going out to sell or purchase. From this source, five millions of dollars have been expected to be raised; a sum nearly equal to the sum expected from all our internal revenues; consequently, to meet the defalcation, our internal revenues must be *nearly doubled*. To double the taxes, and cut off the sources for procuring the money, at the same time, seems to us irreconcilable with the maxims of prudence.

By the passage of this law, we shall be almost entirely deprived of the importation of some articles absolutely necessary to our existence: the article of salt is now excessively high in all the eastern states; and the probability is, that there will not, in the space of a year, be enough for the consumption of the country. Some may have barely enough at an enormous price; others, and particularly the poor, none.

We really cannot see the wisdom or propriety of imposing a tax on the *capacity of stills*, solely engaged in making spirits from foreign materials, and immediately afterwards prevent the owners from obtaining the *materials for carrying on their distilleries*: yet it is a fact, that there are a number of such distilleries, in which large capitals are vested; and this law will clearly prevent almost the whole of them from pursuing their business. In regard to this matter, we are in this dilemma, either the nation must lose the revenue by the failure of the owners to take licences, or, the distillers be shortly ruined.

We believe that the passage of this law will lead to *prosecutions almost without number*, and to *perjuries almost correspondent*. There are some persons we grant so patriotic and so respectful to the powers that be, that they would not escape utter ruin by the violation of an act of their government; but this is not the temper of more than a majority: many, in the sunshine of prosperity, will amuse us with handsome declarations of their willingness to undergo privations for the sake of their country's good, who, in the days of trial and adversity, will prove that they were not *sincere*, or that they did not *know themselves*. Under this law, *the strongest imaginable temptations* will present themselves; to the avaricious, the prospect of a vast price, combined with the want of moral principle, will tempt to elude its operation, even in trading with our enemy; the manufacturer, whose progress in business depends entirely upon the importation of some foreign article, will be strongly tempted to its violation; to the merchant, who

has on hand a large quantity of articles of American growth, which he is *indebted for*, and who may expect to be *ruined*, unless he makes a speedy sale, the temptation is excessively strong; and if we add, that himself and a beloved family are to be saved thereby from *poverty and distress*, the temptation would be almost *irresistible*. These temptations will occur, under all the circumstances we have stated; many violations and evasions will occur with various shades of moral impropriety, and among the various shifts to elude the penalties of the law consequent upon its violations, many perjuries may be expected. A wise government will be careful not to extend its penal code to acts not in themselves immoral, without the most evident necessity.

This law will, in our opinion, have a very *demoralizing effect* upon the commercial part of the nation, and lead to the practice of hereafter evading all our revenue laws, in relation to foreign commerce. The temptations to violations, every person will admit are strong; the situation of our coast, combined with the aid of the squadrons of the enemy, will facilitate them; actions essentially different in a moral point of view are confounded: violations will take place, and profit be the result. A band of our citizens having once profited by the violation of a law in relation to commerce, many of them having eluded prosecutions by immoral shifts, will have their minds well prepared to evade *every commercial regulation* hereafter, when tempted thereto by the prospect of gain. Too many restrictions on moral conduct confound virtue and vice.

We believe that *many struggles will take place between those attempting to violate the law*, and the revenue officers and those aiding them, and this state of things may take place, upon the mere suspicion of an intention to violate; that much bloodshed may ensue: indeed it is difficult to say how far those occurrences may extend, in rousing the people to acts of

violence: but sure we are, that many will thereby become, in mind, alienated from the government; and sure we are, that such occurrences have a dangerous tendency, as they respect the stability of our institutions.

We believe that a large portion of the energies of this nation, will be called into action for the purpose of carrying this law into operation, that would be better employed in active operations upon our enemy, and that the nation will be consequently subjected to heavy expenses.

The *coasting trade*, between the different states, is by this law, entirely cut off. This traffic is highly important in many points of view; thereby the surplus products of the states are exchanged, in a manner well calculated to add to the convenience and comfort of the whole; and a scarcity of any of the necessaries of life in one state, are replenished by others; it moreover tends strongly to cement the band of union among the several states, by a continued reciprocity of advantages.

We cannot but believe, that this law will have in a considerable degree the effect of palsyng and benumbing our industry and enterprize, in agricultural and commercial pursuits; for to us it seems clear, that the agriculturist will be less anxious to produce a large quantity of bread-stuff &c. for market, when he perceives in the government a disposition to check the course of commerce, by an embargo; and it seems equally clear, that men will not enter into commercial pursuits with alacrity, when they see that after they have made the most judicious arrangements at great expense, their whole scheme, however flattering, may be blasted in an instant, by the interposition of the government.

We view this measure as having the effect of a *premium*, to all those countries capable of producing the same articles for exportation as our own; and a premium at our present expense, and perhaps to our great loss hereafter. By withholding our products, those

nations who can sell the same articles, will be enabled to get a higher price: by getting a good price, they will be excited to greater industry and to the exercise of greater skill; they will be enabled to produce a larger quantity, and become permanently our rivals to our great disadvantage. We know that there are vast countries in Europe, Asia, and America, of equal fertility with our own.

Another of the evil effects of this measure will be the *throwing a number of our sailors out of business*. This seems to us almost self evident; for the ship owners cannot be expected to employ sailors when they are not permitted to navigate; consequently all beyond the number requisite to man the national war vessels and our few privateers, will be left on dry land, without money or business; and from the disposition and habits of sailors, may be expected to embrace the opportunity of going into foreign service through the medium of neutral vessels going out in ballast. How does this *comport with the sentiment* "Free trade and sailors' rights," so often repeated in the exclusively republican papers of our country? This sentiment seems to have been for some time the *burthen of our song*; but suddenly we take a course which will put down almost all trade; and which evinces the utmost disregard of the rights or interest of sailors. How variable our notes!

We view this law as highly objectionable, on account of the very extensive and *undefined powers* with which it vests the President and those acting under his authority, in the execution of this law. We mean not to say that the President will abuse his powers, but who can say, the numerous *persons concerned* in its execution under his instructions, will not from ignorance and from malice to individuals, commit many, very many, acts of oppression on the rights of the people, not within the contemplation of the President or Congress, but justified by the letter of the law and the instructions. We believe that many such acts will occur.

This law, among its many provisions, declares, that if any person or persons shall put &c. on board any

ship, vessel, boat, or water craft, or into any waggon, sled, or other carriage or vehicle, or in any other manner attempt to convey any specie, goods, wares &c. with intent to export &c. the same without the United States; such waggon, &c. may be seized and forfeited. Under principles of this sort, great abuses and exactions may be expected. Merely because a waggon or sled is moving towards the sea coast or the line of the Canadas, a revenue officer may suppose the owner is attempting to violate the embargo law, and may seize the same; the owner may be conscious of his innocence, and feel restive, or he may conceive that he has not given such evidence of a determination to violate the law, as to justify the exercise of any violence towards him, and become heated and vexed with the officer. Under such circumstances, force will be opposed to force; the owner on his side, calling in to his aid his friends and relatives, boiling with rage; on the other, the officer drawing to his aid such as he can; violent acts will result, and the progress to a state of civil war be short. The case of Wat Tyler in British history, is very apposite to shew how a nation may be convulsed and thrown into a state of civil war through the operation, or by the attempt to execute an unpopular law. In the case alluded to, the British parliament had passed a law for a poll tax on all persons above a certain age; one of the persons concerned in the execution, called on Tyler for the amount of his taxes, or to ascertain the number of persons in his family liable to the tax; they disputed respecting the age of one of Tyler's daughters; the officer resorted to an indecent mode of ascertaining the fact of her age, and Tyler slew him: this, although but the case of Tyler and the officer, was well nigh producing a complete revolution in England. The law was in itself odious, and the indecent act of the officer, under the pretence of executing it, so inflamed the minds of the people, that thousands flocked to the aid of Tyler; and the monarchy and aristocracy of the country were shook to the centre; and indeed all the institutions of the country;

wise, as well as unwise, jeopardized; for who can bridle an infuriated people?

We view this law as highly objectionable, because it brings under the same measure of punishment, actions which in a *moral point of view are essentially different*, and because it punishes a *mere intent* in like manner with the actual commission of the fact. The case of a person going out with a cargo of American products to a neutral port with the view of selling the same, in order to pay his debts and save himself and family from beggary, is confounded with the case of the person going out and selling to the enemy, with the view of aiding them in the war; and the *mere intent*, or what is the same, the *attempt*, is punished in like manner with the commission of the fact. All wise legislation heretofore, has gone upon the principle, that the act is qualified by the intention or temper of mind; but wisdom has forbid that the will should be taken for the deed. There may be repentance and the deed avoided. Perhaps we may be told, that the law could not be executed, that it would be abortive without this rigour: in answer to this, we have only to say, that we cannot see the propriety of making war upon our own citizens, and of disregarding the plainest principles of morality and justice, upon the mere speculative probability that it would shorten the duration of a war with a foreign nation.

Since writing our remarks on the subject of the effect of this law in driving our sailors (4) out of employment and into foreign service, the bill has been returned from the Senate, with an amendment, by which our sailors are prevented from going into the service of foreign nations; and in this way the bill passed. Our sailors, with the exception of such as are employed in our vessels of war and cruisers, are also embargoed. We have now to remark, that the loss of sailors in the way which we contemplated is guarded against; but we do not view the law as being in the least improved. The case of sailors, placed in the situation of

(4) See note at the end.

ours, without business, and prohibited from seeking it where it may be found, is almost past endurance. Sailors are generally fitted exclusively for their own business....they are qualified for no other....they are generally prodigal of their earnings; so that with respect to the greater part of them, they will be reduced to the disagreeable alternatives of begging, stealing, or starving, and going without clothes. To deny a portion of our people the privilege of pursuing the business which they are *alone fit for*, seems really hard; and to deny them at the same time, the privilege of going abroad to seek such business, when their very existence may be said to depend upon it, is *passing hard*.

This law, it is true, is only to remain in force for something more than a year; but we believe that any argument which could now be advanced in its support, would apply with equal force for its continuance during the war: and indeed, we think such duration would have more the appearance of consistency, and as a measure resulting from a thorough conviction of its utility as a war measure, than the present. In the one case, we would seem to pursue a course which we thought wise; in the other, we seem only to be making an experiment. Let us then for a moment contemplate it as a permanent measure of hostility: a majority of this nation believe our enemy has long been laboring for a monopoly of the commerce of the world, and that this was the end designed in promulgating their orders in council; and in this opinion we concur with the majority. We then ask emphatically, whether the restraining our carriers from the ocean, is calculated to *counteract*, or to *favor this point* of British policy? Our answer is, that it would favor it: thereby her only dangerous rival in carrying and in commercial speculation, leaves her to carry for the world, and to buy and sell for the world; *the very state of things which she desires*. She then could exact her own price for carrying, and her own price for every commodity sold. We believe it could be demonstrated as clearly as any pro-

position in the mathematics, that our enemy would make a great bargain by ceding to us her North American possessions for an embargo for a few years. In a few years our numerous vessels, that have rivalled her in every sea, would be *annihilated*, and our *brave and skilful tars*, who have recently become the *terror of her seamen and mariners*, would be dispersed and lost to any useful purpose. She would then truly have the monopoly of all commerce for a very long time, with all its advantages. We have *yielded* it to her for a time

We have, fellow citizens, in our opinion, fairly stated some of the most prominent objections to the passage of this law: many others without doubt could be made by men more conversant with commercial affairs. If our view is correct, the just conclusion is, that the injuries resulting to this nation by the passage of the law, will be *many and very grievous*, such as we will *see and feel*; while the injury resulting to our enemy, will be *inconsiderable*, of which we will *never be sensible*; and which will be in no wise *calculated to shorten the present war*. It is a state of things which she can probably endure for a much longer time than we can.

We expect that there are some who will cry out that we are disposed to *feed our enemy*; and who, from a contracted view of the state of the world, believe that *we alone*, among all the nations of the earth, have breadstuffs to sell; and have it in our power, *instantly*, to put an end to the war by an embargo: to these we say, that we despise all commerce between our citizens and our enemy; and will heartily join in any law for punishing such intercourse: but we can see no good reason why we should sacrifice all the products of our *soil and industry*, when a vast portion of them might be sold to neutrals, merely because some of them may be sold by the neutrals to our enemy. This policy savours too much of the course of the animal in the manger of hay. Against the products of the great manufacturing establishments of our enemy, one of the principal sources

of that active wealth which enables them to trade and fight, our non-importation law is pointed: if it is not sufficiently guarded, we will heartily aid in endeavoring to make it more effectual.

We think we can see a good reason for abstaining from the *purchase or use* of the merchandize of our enemy; but we are not able to see the good policy of withholding all the products of our soil and industry from all the world, because a part may be carried to British markets. *Buy little, and sell much*, we believe to be good policy; because thereby our monied capital will be increased, and the energies of the nation brought to operate with the greater facility.

From the picture which we have here given of British power and resources, some may conclude that we believe the contest hopeless: to those we say, that we have, and would still, under a proper course of war policy, hope for bringing the war to an honorable conclusion. We have trusted and believed, that by excluding their goods from our market, by active, judicious, and vigorous warfare on their Canadian and other provinces in North America, combined with active, judicious, and vigorous operations on the ocean against their ships and commerce, through our national vessels of war and privateer cruisers, we would convince our enemy that it was most politic to do us justice, and give up their favorite project of monopolizing the commerce of the world.

In submitting these observations, we are willing to admit that personal considerations have had much influence. We believe that many worthy men in this nation have been driven out of the pale of popular favor by a little newspaper ranting, giving to the people all that can be said on one side, and withholding all on the other. Indeed, we believe this matter is *systematised*, and when applied to a public character, is called "*writing him down.*" We have determined not to be written down tamely and quietly; and we believe also, that it is important that the people should,

in all cases of moment, hear and weigh the arguments on both sides. Under this impression, and with a view to our justification, we have offered the foregoing remarks.

We have the charity to believe that many wise honest men differed from us upon the subject of the embargo; and we wish the same charity extended to ourselves. We do not like the practice of *denouncing and writing down*.

NOTES.

The following statements are subjoined, with a view to the support of our remarks as to the ability of our enemy to supply herself with bread-stuffs, &c. and to show the amount of our loss by this prohibition of all commerce.

(1) The quantity of grain exported from the ports of the Baltic, all of which, except the ports of Denmark, are now open to British commerce, in 1801 amounted to	<i>Bushels.</i> 16,098,032
The exports of grain from the same ports in 1802, (of which 17,595,824 bushels were wheat and rye) amounted to -	20,758,656
Ireland exports some grain every year.... in 1811 Ireland exported to England -	2,591,418
And from the 5th of January 1811 to the 5th of March 1812, the exports of grain from Ireland, to England, Spain, and Portugal, amounted to 1,436,813 barrels, and by reckoning the barrel to contain 5 bushels, amounts to - -	7,184,065
The precise amount of grain exported from the Mediterranean cannot be ascertained by us. It is known, however, that all the immense countries bordering on the Mediterranean are very fertile, and happily adapted to the growth of wheat: it is also known, that large quantities are exported from thence every year. We do not believe it would be extravagant to set down the exports from that quarter as equal to those of the Baltic: we, however, set them down at half the amount, say - - -	10,000,000
We will now state the amount of grain imported into England, taking the average of 10 years.	

From 1775 to 1786, the average importation of wheat and flour was	- -	<i>Bushels.</i> 1,432,776
From 1787 to 1798, the average amount of each year was	- - - -	2,496,544
And from 1799 to 1810, it was	- -	5,551,720

The price of grain in the ports of the Baltic is less than seventy cents per bushel: in the Mediterranean it is higher in price.

We do not ask the people to take these facts on our credit. In support of the facts stated, as to the amount and price of grain exported from the Baltic and Mediterranean, we refer to Oddy's *European Commerce*, and Jackson's *Reflections on the Commerce of the Mediterranean*, and to the natural history of those countries. With regard to the exports of grain from Ireland, and the quantity imported to England from all the world, we refer to documents furnished by the officers of the customs in England in February 1811, and published by order of the House of Commons.

We are informed, from a source entitled to credit, that a contract was made by the British government, during the last year, with some merchants residing in Odessa on the coast of the Black sea, for 10,000,000 bushels of wheat; and the quantity was actually delivered in the ports of Spain and Portugal; and did not average more than one dollar and fifty cents per bushel at the port of delivery.

(2) Buonaparte eulogised the Americans for laying the embargo of 1807, and he had his views; for as soon as wheat and bread-stuffs became very high in England, by our embargo, aided by other circumstances leading to the high price, he opened a licensed trade with England, and actually sold them as much grain as the occasion required; and thus turned the losses and even the ruin of our agriculturists to his advantage. If he does not react over this scene, it will be because there will be no occurrence of a similar opportunity.

(5) The following is a statement of the exports from the United States, of articles the growth and product of our soil, and the exports of articles of foreign growth and product, from 1802 to 1810: the first column shows the amount of exports of domestic products, the second the amount of exports of articles of foreign growth, and the third, the whole amount exported in each year.

Exported in the year	Domestic growth.	Foreign growth.	Total.
1802,	\$ 42,205,961	\$ 15,594,072	\$ 55,800,033
1803,	41,467,477	36,231,597	77,699,074
1804,	42,387,002	53,179,019	95,566,021
1805,	41,253,727	60,283,236	101,536,963
1806,	48,699,592	59,643,558	108,343,150
1807,	9,405,702	12,997,414	22,403,116
1808,	31,405,702	20,797,531	52,203,233
1809,	42,366,675	24,391,295	66,757,970

In 1806...7, when the exportation of the products of American industry were higher in amount than at any former period, amounting to 48,699,592 dollars, this sum is divided as follows:

Product of the sea, fish, &c.	-	-	\$ 2,804,000
Product of the forest. lumber, &c.			5,476,000
Agricultural, bread, flour, &c.	-	-	14,432,000
Cotton and tobacco,	-	-	19,708,000
Manufactures,	-	-	2,409,000
Uncertain,	-	-	4,072,592


Now if it could be admitted, that the whole of the surplus agricultural products of the United States were sold to neutrals, and by them carried directly to the enemy, we ask who would be most injured by the transaction? We, who received the money, the sinews of war, for produce we did not want, and could not use; or the enemy, who received from us, for their money,

supplies which they could get from their allies in Europe?

Can any one believe the embargo will starve the armies of our enemy in Canada? Canada, as early as 1784, exported 500,000 bushels of wheat to England, besides considerable quantities to the West Indies: Canada has ever since exported more or less grain every year; the regular troops now in that country are by some estimated at 12,000; the blockading squadron contains about as many more, say 25,000 in all, to be supported; requiring about 60,000 barrels of flour for their daily rations, for twelve months. If the flour should cost the enemy five dollars per barrel more on account of the embargo, which would pay freight from the Black sea; we would only then injure the enemy to the value of 300,000 dollars; and to effect this, would injure ourselves to the amount of thirty or forty millions of dollars. The man who would manage his private affairs thus, would be in danger of having them judicially confided to other hands for management.

We repeat again, that men and money are, in our opinion, the only means by which Canada can or will be reduced; they are the means, and the only means, in our humble opinion, by which this war can or will ever be successfully terminated; and we cannot but regret to see measures adopted paralyzing this potent arm of the government, the country's best hope.

(4) We have 100,000 registered seamen; of these, from ten to fifteen thousand may find employment on board our national vessels of war. What is to become of the balance?





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